What can we learn, Kant asked, from these confusing antinomies? His answer is: our concepts of space and time do not apply to the world as a whole. The concepts of space and time apply, of course, to ordinary physical things and events. But space and time themselves are neither things nor events. They cannot be observed; by nature they are of a completely different character. Most likely they limit things and events in a certain way, they can be compared with a system of objects or with a system catalog for ordering observations. Space and time do not refer to the actual empirical world of things and events, but to our own spiritual arsenal, the spiritual tool with which we comprehend the world. Space and time function like instruments of observation. When we observe a certain process or event, we localize it, as a rule, directly and intuitively into a space-time structure. Therefore, we can characterize space and time as a structural (ordered) system based not on experience, but used in any experience and applicable to any experience. But such an approach to space and time involves a certain difficulty if we try to apply it to a region that is beyond the scope of all possible experience; our two proofs of the beginning of the world serve as an example of this.

The unfortunate and doubly erroneous name of "transcendental idealism" was given by Kant to the theory which I have presented here. He soon regretted his choice, as it led some of his readers to regard Kant as an idealist and to believe that he rejected the alleged reality of physical things, passing them off as pure representations or ideas. In vain did Kant try to explain that he had rejected only the empirical character and reality of space and time - the empirical character and reality of the kind that we attribute to physical things and processes. But all his efforts to clarify his position were in vain. The difficulty of the Kantian style decided his fate; thus he was doomed to go down in history as the founder of "German idealism." Now is the time to reconsider this assessment. Kant always stressed that physical things are real in space and time - real, not ideal. As for the absurd metaphysical speculations of the school of "German idealism", the title chosen by Kant "Critique of Pure Reason" heralded his critical offensive against such speculations. Pure reason is criticized, in particular a priori "pure" conclusions of the mind about the world, which do not follow from sensory experience and are not verified by observations. Kant criticizes "pure reason", thus showing that a purely speculative, not carried out on the basis of observations, reasoning about the world must always lead us to antinomies. Kant wrote his "Critique ...", which was formed under the influence of Hume, with the aim of showing that the boundaries of a possible sensible world coincide with the boundaries of reasonable theorizing about the world.

Confirmation of the correctness of this theory, he considered found when he discovered that it contains the key to the second important problem - the problem of the significance of Newtonian physics. Like all physicists of that time, Kant was completely convinced of the truth and indisputability of Newton's theory. He believed that this theory could not be only the result of accumulated observations. What could still serve as the basis for its truth? To solve this problem, Kant first of all investigated the grounds for the truth of geometry. Euclidean geometry, he said, is based not on observation, but on our spatial intuition, on our intuitive understanding of spatial relationships. A similar situation occurs in Newtonian physics. The latter, although confirmed by observations, is nevertheless the result not of observations, but of our own methods of thinking, which we use to order, connect, and understand our sensations. Not facts, not sensations, but our own mind - the whole system of our spiritual experience - is responsible for our natural scientific theories. The nature we know, with its order and laws, is the result of the ordering activity of our spirit. Kant formulated this idea as follows: "Reason does not draw its laws a priori from nature, but prescribes them to her"

The explication of the concept of human essence is currently one of the most pressing philosophical problems. Without exaggeration, we can say that it has always remained such, and in the future it will also not lose its relevance. Philosophers of different eras and cultures were engaged in the construction of models human essence, offering various methods for its construction. Among the most fundamental and representative anthropological concepts created in European philosophy over the past 250 years, refers to the concept of I. Kant. One of the most influential and notable models of human essence that emerged in the last century can be generally called existential-phenomenological (it will be considered on the basis of an analysis of the texts of M. Merleau-Ponty). The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of these models, namely, the interpretations of the phenomenon of temporality as one of the manifestations of the essence of man, which belong to Kant and Merleau-Ponty.

The basis for choosing these two concepts is, as already mentioned, their commonality in the issue of understanding time. Both Kantian and existential-phenomenological models conceive of time as directly related to subjectivity, i.e. with human consciousness. Both Kant and Merleau-Ponty analyzed time phenomenon. In addition, there is another common feature of these concepts. It lies in the fact that the problem of human essence is comprehended by both philosophers solely on the basis of the experience of self-perception, i.e. on the basis of "inner feeling" (the term belongs to Kant). Both philosophers build

"subjectivist" models of a person: the latter is understood not as one of the objects of the external world, but precisely as a subject, as a carrier of a specific worldview. We can say that in these models a person is not the one who sees but, on the contrary, there is the one who sees not the one they think about a one who thinks etc. Kant and Merleau-Ponty explore the most difficult epistemological task: they analyze the essence of a person, while trying to avoid an intellectual split into a knowing subject and an object of knowledge, in their thinking they start from the direct experience of self-perception and self-consciousness.

Despite the general methodological guidelines, the models of human essence, owned by I. Kant and M. Merleau-Ponty, are fundamentally different, if only because they are separated by a two-hundred-year time period. Comparing them is of scientific interest, since it will allow us to identify and comprehend principles of human understanding, characteristic of the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the philosophy of the twentieth century. Through such a comparison, we will be able to discover the constant and mobile elements of the model of the human essence and perceive the various experiences of its construction.

Kant on time as subjectivity

Time is understood by the Koenigsberg philosopher as a subjective condition necessary for a person to contemplate the world and himself. As you know, according to Kant, time is an a priori form of sensibility, or, in other words, it is “a way to arrange ideas in the soul”.

Thus, the first thing that Kant encounters on the path of studying consciousness is the phenomenon of time. The inner content of a person is defined by him as follows: “Not to mention the fact that ideas external senses constitute the basic material with which we supply our soul, the very time in which we posit these representations and which even precedes the realization of them in experience, being at the basis of them as a formal condition of the way in which we posit them in the soul, already contains relations of succession, simultaneity and that which exists simultaneously with successive being (that which is constant)” [Critique of Pure Reason, § 8; 3, p. 66].

Time in Kant's concept appears as a universal, primary in relation to space form of systematization of sensory experience and at the same time the very condition for the possibility of this experience.

AT in space we contemplate only the external world, while in time we contemplate everything, including ourselves. But time for Kant is something more than a function necessary for the perception of the world. The role of time is global: it makes possible connection of a priori categories and data of sensory experience , it mediates between them. All our a priori categories can be actualized and applied to experience only due to the presence of time in our consciousness. Any strongest abstraction is based on concepts of time; the very category of reality would be impossible for our consciousness if time were not present in it.

So, according to Kant, time constitutes not only our empirical experience, but also our thinking, our representations, our ideas, as long as they are based on a synthesis of experience and a priori categories. That is, time is a hidden foundation for any content of consciousness, in which sensory experience is at least somewhat mixed. From this it follows that the only territory in which time is not effective is the world of pure intellectual entities, the noumenon, as well as all the "illegal", not confirmed by experience, ideas of pure reason. Time is a spontaneous ordering reaction of consciousness to the sensory world.

So, we have outlined the main points necessary for understanding Kant's interpretation of time. As an objective phenomenon, time does not exist, it is entirely subjective and a priori (that is, not characteristic of the sensible world). But it is also not inherent in the noumenal world, which indirectly follows from the following phrase: “if we take objects as they can exist by themselves, then time is nothing” [Critique of Pure Reason; 3, p. 58]. Moreover, as a positive given, as a sphere of human consciousness, time also does not exist. We are forced to state that according to Kant, time is only a form, a method, a function of consciousness. Time itself is alien to any content, it is the idea of ​​a certain universal relation of any possible content.

So, the Kantian subject is a being that has the ability to build temporal relationships. The inner contemplation of oneself is first of all the experience of time. How does time reside within a person? It is a way of arranging something in the soul, but also “the way in which the soul acts on itself by its own activity, namely by the positing of its representations” [ibid.]. It is characteristic that it is precisely from this temporality of the human “inner feeling” that Kant derives the following theorem: « A simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own

existence serves as proof of the existence of objects in space outside of me"[Ibid., p. 162]. That is, we can affirm the reality of things around us only to the extent that we can affirm our own reality. First, we are convinced that we really exist, and only then, proceeding from this, we are convinced of the reality of the world around us.

So Kant believes that time is something fundamentally human. But, although it is directly related to man's awareness of himself, yet the study of time is not equivalent to the knowledge of the human being.

Alternative position: Merleau-Ponty on time

Let us now turn to the phenomenological understanding of time in order to understand the specifics of the Kantian formulation of the problem. AT philosophical literature more than once the "phenomenological" aspects of Kant's thinking have been noted. So Rozeev writes that the speculative isolation from the mind of everything sensible, that is, the separation a priori and aposteriorifor further logical operation with some one layer of thinking - this is the phenomenological reduction or epoch. Mamardashvili also mentions reduction in connection with Kant: according to Merab Konstantinovich, Kant performs the procedure of phenomenological reduction when he claims that “the world must be so arranged according to its physical laws in order to allow an empirical event for some feeling being to extract some experience” . But despite the similarity of the methods of cognition, different researchers can obtain completely different data and draw opposite conclusions from them. How much do Kant and Merleau-Ponty have in common in understanding the problem of time, and what is the reason for this? Let's analyze Merleau-Ponty's position.

1. First of all, the French philosopher declares that Kant's characterization of time as a form of inner feeling is not deep enough. Time is not the most general characteristics"mental facts", "we found a much more intimate connection between time and subjectivity" . (It must be said that Merleau-Ponty here does not take into account the role that time plays in the cognition and constitution of the world by the subject; after all, for Kant it is not just a form of inner feeling, but almost the main thread connecting man and phenomenon.) Further Merlot -Ponti argues that it is necessary to recognize the subject as temporary "not because of some

contingency of the human constitution, but due to internal necessity” [Ibid.]. Well, this statement does not contradict the Kantian view. A person, according to Kant, perceives everything in time also due to internal necessity, A.N. Kruglov even notes that Kant often explains the phenomenon of a priori knowledge not epistemologically, but psychologically and anthropologically. That is, a priori knowledge and forms of sensibility are such because man is made that way and there are no other variants of intelligent consciousness available to our experience to clarify anything otherwise.

What is the essence of Merleau-Ponty's criticism of Kant? The point is that thinking of time as constituted by consciousness and anything in general, this means, according to Merleau-Ponty, to miss the very essence of time, the essence of which consists in transition. The constituted time is already once and for all determined, having become, time, which in its essence cannot be. Merleau-Ponty's attempts are aimed at comprehending another, true time, when it becomes clear what the transition itself is. With the intellectual synthesis of time, about which Kant speaks, it turns out that we think of all moments of time as exactly the same, similar, consciousness becomes, as it were, contemporary to all times. But to treat time in this way means to lose it, because the essence of temporality is not that it is an endless series of identical “nows”. The essence of time is in reverse - that the past, present and future are not the same, they have some mysterious and fundamental difference, even though the future always becomes the present and then the past. “Not a single dimension of time can be derived from others” [Ibid., p. 284], and the abstract idea of ​​time just inevitably generalizes all its moments, makes them similar to one new point in space. Merleau-Ponty tries to think of time without losing sight of the individuality of each of its events.

Let's try to understand this criticism. First, does it really mean to constitute time to deprive it of its specificity, its "core"? To constitute in the usual sense is to substantiate essentially as such, to give grounds, to make possible on the basis of certain principles. If consciousness constitutes time, then how can it deprive this time of its essence, which time itself communicates? Or is time a spontaneity that cannot have any definite principles at all, and the human mind imposes them on it? Then the essence of time does not fit into the ordinary scientific mind, which works with generics and abstractions. Merleau Ponty probably means

second. From his criticism of Kant, the conclusion clearly follows: Time, according to Merleau-Ponty, is not a given of consciousness, and consciousness does not constitute or unfold time. Behind Kant's critique, there is a clear desire to see in time something more than a product of the human mind.

2. Time - “this is not some real process, an actual sequence that I would only register. It is born from my connection with things(highlighted by me. - A.M.)"[Ibid., p. 272]. What is for a person in the past or future, in the world around, there is at the moment - places that once visited or will visit, people with whom they were or will be familiar. That is, as mentioned above, "time involves looking at time." But, in fact, according to Kant, time is born at the moment of the meeting of human consciousness and the phenomenal world. This is well illustrated by the controversy between Kant and Johann Eberhard on the origin of a priori ideas. Insisting that there is nothing inherent in man, Kant calls the forms of space and time "originally acquired." Only the fact that “all his ideas arise in this way” is inherent in a person from the very beginning, that is, human consciousness carries in itself relation to objects not yet perceived, or, in other words, "subjective conditions of spontaneity of thinking." The possibility of temporal contemplation is innate, but not time itself. Consequently, if time is not innate, it is acquired by a person only at the moment of perception of the world, as soon as the phenomenon enters into human experience.

And yet, according to Kant, time is nevertheless "rooted" in the subject, as long as the foundations of the possibility of time are a priori laid down in consciousness. On this point, the views of the German and French philosophers fundamentally diverge.

3. According to Merleau-Ponty, existence itself is not temporary. In order to become temporary, it lacks non-existence, just as the movement of bodies needs a void in which they would move. AT real world everything is all being, while man is recognized as the bearer of non-being. That is, time “times” due to the combination of being and non-being, and the latter is rooted in a person. If non-being is not inherent in the world, but is inherent only in man, is not then non-being the essence of man? Merleau-Ponty does not ask this question, but regarding time he claims that it is formed from a "mixture" of being and non-being.

For Kant, being itself, of course, is also not temporal, for time is a purely subjective phenomenon. Kant practically does not argue about non-existence. Almost the only fragment that mentions

next to the concepts of time and non-being, is contained in the “Critique of Pure Reason”: “Reality in a pure rational concept is that which corresponds to sensation in general, therefore, that, the concept of which in itself points to being (in time). Negation is that, the concept of which represents non-existence (in time). Therefore, the opposite of being and non-being consists in the difference between the same time, in one case filled, in the other case empty. From this follows a conclusion that is directly opposite to the idea of ​​Merleau-Ponty: it is not time that is formed due to the interaction of being and non-being, but just being and non-being exist due to time. It turns out that they are something like reservoirs of time, full and empty.

4. But doubts arise here - Are Kant and Merleau-Ponty really talking about time in the same sense? As you know, being and non-being for Kant are only categories of pure reason, the actual reality of which is very problematic to assert, and even meaningless, since these are just subjective principles of thinking. Thus, for all his interpretations of being and non-being, Kant, so to speak, does not bear any responsibility. The same applies to time: as such, it does not exist either in the noumenon or in the phenomenon. Is it the same with Merleau Ponty? Being itself, as we have just seen from his text, does not have time. This means that time is somehow (through a person) brought there. At first glance, everything is so, and this is eloquently evidenced by the phrases of Merleau-Ponty, such as the following: “We must understand time as a subject and subject as time” or “we are the emergence of time” . But the very assertion that time needs being (as well as non-being) raises questions. It is unlikely that it can need exclusively human existence, because it is impossible to deny the fact that human existence is a special case of being in general. The situation becomes clearer when Merleau-Ponty starts talking about objective time, as if leaving aside the role of the subject in the emergence of temporality. “The source of objective time with its locations fixed by our gaze must be sought not in temporal synthesis, but in the coherence and reversibility of the past and future, mediated by the present, in the temporal transition itself” [Ibid., p. 280]. Therefore, there is some objective time, it is simply extremely difficult for the subject to comprehend it. Another idea of ​​Merleau-Ponty can be quite unambiguously perceived as an assertion of the objectivity of time: “Time supports what it gave being - at the very moment when it expels it from

being, - insofar as the new being was declared by the previous one as coming to being, and since for this latter to become present and to be doomed to a transition into the past means the same thing ”[Ibid.].

We can conclude that Kant and Merleau-Ponty explicate the concept of time, starting from the fundamental various interpretations its ontological status. If Kant's position is definite and consistent, and time appears in it as a subjective form of sensory contemplation, then Merleau-Ponty's position is highly ambiguous. Now he speaks of time as impossible without a subject (the bearer of the view of time), then as an objective ontological force, like Tao. That is, Merleau-Ponty's time is both objective and subjective at the same time.

Comparison of views on the essence of time, belonging to Kant and Merleau-Ponty, allows us to build the following table.

There are fundamental differences in the considered explications of the concept of time. They are due to the difference in approaches to understanding a person, i.e. difference in anthropological methods. Kant's model of human essence is based on the analysis of intellect, reason; rationality is considered here as a priority quality of a person. In addition, the fundamental thesis of this model is the provision on autonomy of the human being. Thus, Kant's model of human essence can be defined as autonomous rationalistic. Merleau-Ponty, on the contrary, proceeds from the understanding of man as a direct reality, he defines his essence on the basis of a holistic analysis of the entirety of human existence. Merleau-Ponty is not interested in the abilities of a person, but in the very fact of his existence, the latter, according to the existential concept, is not closed on itself and not autonomous. The existence of a person is defined as “being-in-the-world”, where a person is a projection of the world, while the world is a projection of a person. "In the emptiness of the subject itself, we discovered the presence of the world." Consequently, the model of human essence, built by Merleau-Ponty, is directly opposite to Kant's. Here no emphasis is placed on the ratio, and man is not relied upon as an autonomous and self-sufficient being. This model can be called "open-loop" or "total-ontological".

In conclusion, we must answer the question, “does the understanding of time open up prospects for understanding the essence of man, based on the reasoning of I. Kant and M. Merleau-Ponty. First of all, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term "essence". Traditionally under

essence is understood what the thing in itself is. The concept of "essence" has three semantic aspects. First, it indicates the individuality of a thing, its difference from other things. We can say that the essence is the secret of the uniqueness of this or that thing or the reason for its uniqueness. The second aspect: an entity is a constant component of objects, i.e. that which is not subject to change, despite their internal variability. Finally, the third aspect: the essence is that which constitutes a thing, that which "exists" it by itself, gives it a foundation, a principle, an essence. Given all that has been said, is it possible to believe that time is the essence of man? Let us turn first to Kant's position.

On the one hand, according to Kant, the essence of things is unknowable, or rather, it is only partially cognizable (at the level of the phenomenon, to the extent that things are accessible to sensual contemplation). The Kantian term "thing in itself" does not designate the unknowable essence of things, but rather the thing in the aspect of its unknowability. That is, up to a certain limit, any thing is knowable, but beyond this limit it is no longer, this is called the “thing in itself” (at the same time, Kant considered the reality of things in themselves to be problematic). Thus, according to Kant, the essence of a thing is known to a certain extent, this assumption allows us to speak about the essence of man. If we agree with the above meaning of the term that interests us, time can be considered an essential human quality, because this is specifically human a form of contemplation (neither animals nor other rational beings probably have it), moreover, it is constant and unchangeable in any human consciousness. All this leads to the conclusion that time (along with some other moments) realizes a person as a person. But at the same time, one should not forget that time for Kant is just one of the ways of communication between a person and reality, i.e. this is precisely the form, method, function, and not the main content of the human personality (as opposed to morality, freedom, reason, character). Thus, we recognize the essence of a person as the way of his existence, his way of manifesting himself in phenomenal reality.

Merleau-Ponty considers the temporality of man as a special case of the objective temporality of being. It follows from this that time is not something exclusively human; "anthropomorphic" is only one of the forms of time (and this form is most accessible to philosophical analysis). Moreover, he identifies time with being, because There is only one way a person can spend time - living, living time. According to Merleau-Ponty, temporality is identical

being, and at the same time it is identical to subjectivity. That is, the essence of a person is being itself, while time acts as a mediating link: “assimilating”, transforming objective time, a person is included in being and is realized in it.

Thus, the considered concepts of time are opposite to each other both ontologically and methodologically, as well as in the aspect of revealing the essence of man.

Literature

1. Brodsky I.A. Letters to a Roman friend. L., 1991.

2. Gaidenko P.P. The problem of time in modern European philosophy (XVII-XVIII centuries) // Historical and Philosophical Yearbook, 2000. M., 2002. P. 169-195.

3. Kant I. Critique of Pure Reason. Simferopol: Renome, 2003. 464 p.

4. Kruglov A.N. On the origin of a priori representations in Kant // Vopr. philosophy. 1998. No. 10. S. 126-130.

5. Locke J. Cit.: In 3 vols. Vol. 1. M.: Thought, 1985. 621 p.

6. Mamardashvili M.K. Kantian variations. M.: Agraf, 2002. 320 p.

7. Merleau-Ponty M. Temporality (Chapter from the book "Phenomenology of Perception") // Historical and Philosophical Yearbook, 90. M., 1991. P. 271-293.

8. Rozeev D.N. Phenomenon and Phenomenon in Kant's Theoretical Philosophy // Thought. 1997. No. 1. S. 200-208.

9. Chanyshev A.N. Treatise on non-existence // Vopr. philosophy. 1990. No. 10. S. 158-165.

The most important part of the Critique of Pure Reason is the doctrine of space and time. In this section, I propose to undertake a critical examination of this teaching.

It is not easy to give a clear explanation of Kant's theory of space and time, because the theory itself is unclear. It is expounded both in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena. The presentation in the Prolegomena is more popular, but less complete, than in the Critique. First, I will try to explain the theory as clearly as I can. Only after the presentation will I try to criticize it.

Kant believes that immediate objects of perception are conditioned partly by external things and partly by our own perceptual apparatus. Locke accustomed the world to the idea that secondary qualities - colors, sounds, smell, etc. - are subjective and do not belong to the object as it exists in itself. Kant, like Berkeley and Hume, although not in exactly the same way, goes further and makes primary qualities also subjective. For the most part, Kant has no doubt that our sensations have causes, which he calls "things in themselves" or noumena. What appears to us in perception, which he calls a phenomenon, consists of two parts: that which is conditioned by the object, which he calls sensation, and that which is conditioned by our subjective apparatus, which, as he says, arranges the manifold into certain relations. This last part he calls the form of appearance. This part is not the sensation itself and therefore does not depend on the contingency of the environment, it is always the same, because it is always present in us, and it is a priori in the sense that it does not depend on experience. The pure form of sensibility is called "pure intuition" (Anschauung); there are two such forms, namely space and time: one for external sensations, the other for internal ones.

To prove that space and time are a priori forms, Kant advances arguments of two classes: the arguments of one class are metaphysical, and those of the other are epistemological, or, as he calls them, transcendental. Arguments of the first class are derived directly from the nature of space and time, arguments of the second class are derived indirectly from the possibility of pure mathematics. Arguments about space are more fully stated than arguments about time, because the latter are considered to be essentially the same as the former.

With regard to space, four metaphysical arguments are put forward:

1) Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from external experience, since space is assumed when referring sensations to something external and external experience is only possible through the representation of space.

2) Space is the necessary a priori representation which underlies all external perceptions, since we cannot imagine that space should not exist, whereas we can imagine that nothing exists in space.

3) Space is not a discursive or general concept of the relations of things in general, since there is only one space, and what we call "spaces" are parts of it, not examples.

4) Space appears as infinite given a quantity that contains within itself all parts of space. This relation is different from that which the concept has to its instances, and consequently space is not a concept, but an Anschauung.

The transcendental argument about space is derived from geometry. Kant claims that Euclidean geometry is known a priori, although it is synthetic, that is, not deducible from logic itself. Geometric proofs, he argues, depend on figures. We can see, for example, that if two lines intersecting at right angles are given, then only one straight line can be drawn through the point of their intersection at right angles to both lines. This knowledge, according to Kant, is not derived from experience. But my intuition can anticipate what will be found in the object only if it contains only the form of my sensibility, which determines in my subjectivity all real impressions. The objects of sense must obey geometry, because geometry concerns our ways of perceiving, and therefore we cannot perceive otherwise. This explains why geometry, although synthetic, is a priori and apodictic.

The arguments for time are essentially the same, except that geometry is replaced by arithmetic, since counting requires time.

Let us now examine these arguments one by one.

The first of the metaphysical arguments about space is: “Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from external experience. Indeed, the representation of space must already be at the basis in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside of me (that is, to something in a different place in space than where I am), and also for the fact that so that I can represent them as being outside [and beside] each other, therefore, not only as different, but also as being in different places. As a result, external experience is the only one possible through the representation of space.

The phrase "outside of me (that is, in a different place than I myself am)" is difficult to understand. As a thing-in-itself, I am nowhere, and there is nothing spatially outside of me. My body can only be understood as a phenomenon. Thus, everything that is really meant is expressed in the second part of the sentence, namely, that I perceive different objects as objects in different places. The image that may then arise in one's mind is that of a cloakroom attendant who hangs different coats on different hooks; the hooks must already exist, but the subjectivity of the cloakroom attendant tidies up the coat.

Here, as elsewhere in Kant's theory of the subjectivity of space and time, there is a difficulty that he never seems to have felt. What makes me arrange the objects of perception the way I do it, and not otherwise? Why, for example, do I always see people's eyes above their mouths and not below them? According to Kant, the eyes and mouth exist as things in themselves and evoke my separate perceptions, but nothing in them corresponds to the spatial arrangement that exists in my perception. This is contrary to the physical theory of colors. We do not believe that there are colors in matter in the sense that our perceptions have color, but we believe that different colors correspond to different wavelengths. Since waves, however, include space and time, they cannot be the causes of our perceptions for Kant. If, on the other hand, the space and time of our perceptions have copies in the world of matter, as physics suggests, then geometry applies to these copies and Kant's argument is false. Kant believed that the mind arranges the raw material of sensations, but he never thought about what needs to be said, why the mind arranges this material in this way and not otherwise.

With regard to time, the difficulty is even greater, since when considering time, causality must be taken into account. I perceive lightning before I perceive thunder. Thing in itself BUT causes my perception of lightning, and another thing in itself AT causes my perception of thunder, but BUT Not earlier AT, since time exists only in relations of perceptions. Why then two timeless things BUT and AT produce an action at different times? This must be wholly arbitrary, if Kant is right, and then there must be no relation between BUT and AT corresponding to the fact that the perception evoked BUT, earlier than the perception caused by AT.

The second metaphysical argument states that one can imagine that there is nothing in space, but one cannot imagine that there is no space. It seems to me that a serious argument cannot be based on what can and cannot be imagined. But I emphasize that I deny the possibility of representing empty space. You can imagine yourself looking at a dark cloudy sky, but then you yourself are in space and you imagine clouds that you cannot see. As Weininger pointed out, Kant's space is absolute, like Newton's space, and not just a system of relations. But I don't see how one can imagine an absolutely empty space.

The third metaphysical argument says: “Space is not a discursive, or, as they say, general, concept of the relations of things in general, but a purely visual representation. Indeed, one can imagine only one single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, then by them they mean only parts of one and the same single space, moreover, these parts cannot precede a single all-encompassing space as its constituent elements (from which its addition would be possible), but can only be conceived as being in it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore also the general concept of spaces in general, is based solely on limitations. From this Kant concludes that space is an a priori intuition.

The essence of this argument is the denial of multiplicity in space itself. What we call "spaces" are neither examples of the general concept of "space" nor parts of a whole. I do not know exactly what, according to Kant, their logical status is, but, in any case, they logically follow space. For those who accept, as practically everyone does nowadays, a relativistic view of space, this argument falls away, since neither "space" nor "spaces" can be considered as substances.

The fourth metaphysical argument concerns mainly the proof that space is an intuition and not a concept. His premise - “space is imagined (or represented - vorgestellt) as infinite given magnitude." This is the view of a person living in a flat area, like the area where Koenigsberg is located. I do not see how an inhabitant of the Alpine valleys could accept it. It is difficult to understand how something infinite can be "given". I must take it for granted that the part of space that is given is that which is filled with objects of perception, and that for other parts we have only a sense of the possibility of movement. And if it is permissible to apply such a vulgar argument, then modern astronomers maintain that space is not really infinite, but is rounded, like the surface of a ball.

The transcendental (or epistemological) argument, which is best established in the Prolegomena, is clearer than the metaphysical arguments and is also more clear to be refuted. "Geometry", as we now know, is a name that combines two different scientific disciplines. On the one hand, there is pure geometry, which deduces consequences from axioms without questioning whether these axioms are true. It does not contain anything that does not follow from logic and is not "synthetic", and does not need figures, such as those used in geometry textbooks. On the other hand, there is geometry as a branch of physics, as it, for example, appears in the general theory of relativity - it is an empirical science in which axioms are derived from measurements and differ from the axioms of Euclidean geometry. Thus, there are two types of geometry: one is a priori, but not synthetic, the other is synthetic, but not a priori. This gets rid of the transcendental argument.

Let us now try to consider the questions that Kant raises when he considers space in a more general way. If we proceed from the view, which is accepted in physics as self-evident, that our perceptions have external causes which are (in a certain sense) material, then we come to the conclusion that all real qualities in perceptions differ from qualities in their unperceived causes, but that there is a certain structural similarity between the system of perceptions and the system of their causes. There is, for example, a correspondence between colors (as perceived) and waves of a certain length (as inferred by physicists). Likewise, there must be a correspondence between space as an ingredient of perceptions and space as an ingredient in the system of unperceived causes of perceptions. All this is based on the principle "same cause, same effect", with the opposite principle: "different effects, different reasons". Thus, for example, when the visual representation BUT appears to the left of the visual representation AT, we will assume that there is some corresponding relationship between the cause BUT and reason AT.

We have, according to this view, two spaces, one subjective and the other objective, one known in experience and the other only deduced. But there is no difference in this respect between space and other aspects of perception, such as colors and sounds. All of them in their subjective forms are known empirically. All of them, in their objective forms, are derived by means of the principle of causality. There is no reason to consider our knowledge of space in any way different from our knowledge of color and sound and smell.

As regards time, the situation is different, for if we retain faith in the imperceptible causes of perceptions, objective time must be identical with subjective time. If not, we run into the difficulties already considered in connection with lightning and thunder. Or take this case: you hear talking person, you answer him and he hears you. His speech and his perceptions of your answer, both insofar as you touch them, are in an unperceivable world. And in this world, the first precedes the last. In addition, his speech precedes your perception of sound in the objective world of physics. Your perception of sound precedes your response in the subjective world of perception. And your answer precedes his perception of sound in the objective world of physics. It is clear that the relation "precedes" must be the same in all these statements. While there is therefore an important sense in which perceptual space is subjective, there is no sense in which perceptual time is subjective.

The above arguments presuppose, as Kant thought, that perceptions are caused by things in themselves, or, as we should say, by events in the world of physics. This assumption, however, is by no means logically necessary. If it is rejected, perceptions cease to be in any essential sense "subjective" because there is nothing to be opposed to them.

The "thing-in-itself" was a very uncomfortable element in Kant's philosophy, and it was rejected by his immediate successors, who accordingly fell into something very reminiscent of solipsism. The contradictions in Kant's philosophy inevitably led to the fact that the philosophers who were under his influence had to develop rapidly either in an empiricist or in an absolutist direction. In fact, in the latter direction, and developed German philosophy up to the period after the death of Hegel.

Kant's immediate successor, Fichte (1762-1814), rejected "things-in-themselves" and carried subjectivism to a degree that seemed to border on insanity. He believed that I is the only finite reality and that it exists because it asserts itself. But I, which has an inferior reality, also exists only because I accepts it. Fichte is important not as a pure philosopher, but as the theoretical founder of German nationalism in his Orations to the German Nation (1807–1808), in which he sought to inspire the Germans to resist Napoleon after the Battle of Jena. I how a metaphysical concept was easily confused with Fichte's empirical; because the I was a German, it followed that the Germans were superior to all other nations. “To have character and to be German,” says Fichte, “undoubtedly mean the same thing.” On this basis, he developed a whole philosophy of nationalist totalitarianism, which had a very great influence in Germany.

His immediate successor Schelling (1775-1854) was more attractive but no less subjectivist. He was closely associated with German romance. AT philosophically he is insignificant, although he was famous in his time. An important result of the development of Kant's philosophy was the philosophy of Hegel.

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KANT'S PHILOSOPHY: BASIC CONCEPTS AND PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS
Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant (life years 1724-1804) the founder of classical German philosophy. It was Kant who made the so-called "Copernican coup"
All the work of the philosopher can be divided into two periods; subcritical and critical period.
Precritical period - it's like a preparatory stage preceding critical period. During this period, Kant was engaged in the natural sciences; physics, astronomy, mathematics. Over time, Kant will conclude and say that modern science sins with narrowness and one-sidedness of thinking.

Critical period - It was during this period that Kant revealed himself as a philosopher. Kant asks such philosophical questions; What can I know? What can my mind know, and what are its sources? What is a person? Kant will write three works: the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of Judgment.

"Critique of Pure Reason" it is this work that best reflects Kant's philosophy.
The possibilities of boundaries and limits in our cognition are the key task of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant wants to show what more a person can claim in cognition. According to Kant, pure reason is a free mind, free from any empirical experience, an autonomous mind, independent of the material conditions in which a person lives.
All our knowledge begins with experience. If a person is deprived of any connection with the outside world, then knowledge will become impossible. Without feelings and emotions, human existence is not possible. Kant asks "How is pure non-experiential knowledge possible?"

Philosophy of Kant: "The Theory of Judgment"
According to Kant, people have two kinds of judgments;
A posteriori judgments - these are judgments of experience, judgments that are possible only within the framework of a specific observed experience.

A priori judgments - pre-experimental judgments - that is, judgments that are the key to any human cognitive ability.

Explanation:
All the content of our judgments comes entirely from our experience and these are not innate judgments like those of Descartes. Each person begins to cognize this world with the help of already established forms of cognition, with already formed types of our judgments developed with the help of the experience of previous generations.
Human experience is boundless, it is constantly expanding, so each of us, starting to know this world, has a huge database.

In its turn a priori knowledge, Kant also divides into:
A priori analytic judgments are explanatory statements. These judgments have properties (qualities) already contained in the subject.

A priori synthetic judgments- the quality of this judgment is not contained directly in the subject, but is connected with it indirectly.
These are judgments that can expand our knowledge without resorting to experience. For example, Kant considered all mathematical judgments to be a priori synthetic because they cannot be observed in the world around us (it is not possible to observe the number 5), but they can be represented.

Philosophy of Kant: "Theory of knowledge" epistemology:
Kant says that our experience does not give us exact knowledge of the world around us. It is impossible to know the object as it really is. Kant introduces terms such as:

Noumenon (thing in itself) - an object that will forever remain inaccessible to our knowledge as it is.
Phenomenon (appearance) - the way in which this object appears to us as we can imagine it.

A person is both a phenomenon and a noumenon, for myself I am a phenomenon, that is, I can know myself, but for another person, I am a noumenon thing in itself.

In order for us to begin to cognize an object, it must initially be given to us (to appear to us) in order to cognize, we need to perform at least some kind of activity, movement. Knowing the subject, it will appear, but to each in a different way, because we see this world in completely different ways, we perceive objects also in different ways.

Philosophy of Kant. Space and time:
Kant asks; Is there something in our cognition that would be completely uniform for all people, regardless of their mood, level of knowledge, or peculiarities of perception? Are there immutable constants in our cognition?

Kant will answer this question in the following way; If we consistently discard from the empirical subject, all those qualities and properties that a person observes and sees, that is; color, smell, taste, it will remain, the space that this object occupies. Space is one of the pure forms in our sensory cognition. We can see the world around us differently, treat it differently. But we always act in space. Another pure form of our sensory knowledge according to Kant, this is time (here Kant, has an introduction, the space-time continuum). Space and time are the necessary forms, pure transcendental conditions, for the formation of experience.

Philosophy of Kant: Transcendental Aesthetics. Definitions according to Kant:
The concept of transcendent - according to Kant, it is fundamentally unknowable, something that is not possible to know. Objects and concepts that will forever remain beyond our understanding (the Idea of ​​God, the phenomenon of the immortality of the soul), this is hidden knowledge from our cognitive abilities.
The concept of transcendental - the construction of our cognitive ability, the conditions of experience. Creative activity and the search for a person, the ability to design the conditions of experience, before the appearance of the experience itself (for example; hypotheses, ideas, theories).

Philosophy of Kant: The Transcendental Unity of Apperception
What does it mean, such a complex concept as the Transcendental unity of apperception.
perception- unconscious sensation. (A person constantly feels many stimuli at the same time, but is not aware of them).
Accordingly apperception are conscious sensations.
Unity of Apperception is the totality, all conscious sensations, the understanding that I am I.
Transcendental unity of apperception- this is when I am aware of ideas about something, at the same time being aware of myself as myself. Awareness of oneself in this world. In other words, this is the unity of consciousness, which synthesizes the diverse content of all concepts.

Philosophy of Kant: Ethics
Man is the most unknowable riddle and mystery that Kant tried to unravel. Kant's ethics is a science that considers the relationship between people, and the person himself, as the highest value.
Kant asks the question, What is morality, morality?
Morality- this is an internal, necessary property of a person. The only source that forms the morality of a person is moral law that exists within the individual.
Kant believes that the desire for happiness is inherent in man, and it is this desire that unites everyone, because everyone wants to be happy. But is it possible for a person to be both happy and moral at the same time? Here Kant comes to the conclusion that this is impossible. Happiness and morality are mutually exclusive concepts.
When we strive for happiness, we forget about morality. Sometimes, we achieve our goals on the path to happiness in an immoral way. “The end justifies the means,” even if they are immoral.

Kant's theory of space and time

The most important part of the Critique of Pure Reason is the doctrine of space and time. In this section, I propose to undertake a critical examination of this teaching.

It is not easy to give a clear explanation of Kant's theory of space and time, because the theory itself is unclear. It is expounded both in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena. The presentation in the Prolegomena is more popular, but less complete than in the Critique. First, I will try to explain the theory as clearly as I can. Only after the presentation will I try to criticize it.

Kant believes that immediate objects of perception are conditioned partly by external things and partly by our own perceptual apparatus. Locke accustomed the world to the idea that secondary qualities - colors, sounds, smell, etc. - are subjective and do not belong to the object as it exists in itself. Kant, like Berkeley and Hume, although not in exactly the same way, goes further and makes primary qualities also subjective. For the most part, Kant has no doubt that our sensations have causes, which he calls "things in themselves" or noumena. What appears to us in perception, which he calls a phenomenon, consists of two parts: that which is conditioned by the object, which he calls sensation, and that which is conditioned by our subjective apparatus, which, as he says, arranges the manifold into certain relationships. This last part he calls the form of appearance. This part is not the sensation itself and therefore does not depend on the contingency of the environment, it is always the same, because it is always present in us, and it is a priori in the sense that it does not depend on experience. The pure form of sensibility is called "pure intuition" (Anschauung); there are two such forms, namely, space and time: one for external sensations, the other for internal ones.

To prove that space and time are a priori forms, Kant advances arguments of two classes: the arguments of one class are metaphysical, and those of the other are epistemological, or, as he calls them, transcendental. Arguments of the first class are derived directly from the nature of space and time, arguments of the second class indirectly, from the possibility of pure mathematics. Arguments about space are more fully stated than arguments about time, because the latter are considered to be essentially the same as the former.

With regard to space, four metaphysical arguments are put forward:

1) Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from external experience, since space is assumed when sensations are referred to something external, and external experience is possible only through the representation of space.

2) Space is the necessary a priori representation which underlies all external perceptions, since we cannot imagine that space should not exist, whereas we can imagine that nothing exists in space.

3) Space is not a discursive or general concept of the relations of things in general, since there is only one space and what we call "spaces" are parts of it, not examples.

4) Space is represented as an infinitely given quantity, which contains within itself all parts of space. This relation is different from that which the concept has to its instances, and consequently space is not a concept, but an Anschauung.

The transcendental argument about space is derived from geometry. Kant claims that Euclidean geometry is known a priori, although it is synthetic, that is, not deducible from logic itself. Geometric proofs, he argues, depend on figures. We can see, for example, that if two lines intersecting at right angles to one another are given, then only one straight line can be drawn through their point of intersection at right angles to both lines. This knowledge, according to Kant, is not derived from experience. But my intuition can anticipate what will be found in the object only if it contains only the form of my sensibility, which determines in my subjectivity all real impressions. The objects of sense must obey geometry, because geometry concerns our ways of perceiving, and therefore we cannot perceive otherwise. This explains why geometry, although synthetic, is a priori and apodictic.

The arguments for time are essentially the same, except that geometry is replaced by arithmetic, since counting requires time.

Let us now examine these arguments one by one. The first of the metaphysical arguments about space is: “Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from external experience. Indeed, the representation of space must already be at the basis in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (that is, to what in a different place in space than where I am), and also so that I can represent them as being outside (and next to each other, therefore, not only as different, but also as being in different places. As a result, external experience is the only one possible through the representation of space.

The phrase "outside of me (that is, in a different place than I myself am)" is difficult to understand. As a thing-in-itself, I am nowhere, and there is nothing spatially outside of me. My body can only be understood as a phenomenon. Thus, everything that is really meant is expressed in the second part of the sentence, namely that I perceive different objects as objects in different places. The image that may then arise in one's mind is that of a cloakroom attendant who hangs different coats on different hooks; the hooks must already exist, but the subjectivity of the cloakroom attendant tidies up the coat.

Here, as elsewhere in Kant's theory of the subjectivity of space and time, there is a difficulty that he never seems to have felt. What makes me arrange the objects of perception the way I do it, and not otherwise? Why, for example, do I always see people's eyes above their mouths and not below them? According to Kant, the eyes and mouth exist as things in themselves and evoke my separate perceptions, but nothing in them corresponds to the spatial arrangement that exists in my perception. This is contrary to the physical theory of colors. We do not believe that there are colors in matter in the sense that our perceptions have color, but we believe that different colors correspond to different wavelengths. Since waves, however, include space and time, they cannot be the causes of our perceptions for Kant. If, on the other hand, the space and time of our perceptions have copies in the world of matter, as physics suggests, then geometry applies to these copies and Kant's argument is false. Kant believed that the mind arranges the raw material of sensations, but he never thought about what needs to be said, why the mind arranges this material in this way and not otherwise.

With regard to time, the difficulty is even greater, since when considering time, causality must be taken into account. I perceive lightning before I perceive thunder. The thing-in-itself A causes my perception of lightning, and the other thing-in-itself B causes my perception of thunder, but A not before B, since time exists only in relation of perceptions. Why then two timeless things A and B act at different times? This must be wholly arbitrary if Kant is right, and then there must be no relation between A and B corresponding to the fact that the perception evoked by A precedes the perception evoked by B.

The second metaphysical argument states that one can imagine that there is nothing in space, but one cannot imagine that there is no space. It seems to me that a serious argument cannot be based on what can and cannot be imagined. But I emphasize that I deny the possibility of representing empty space. You can imagine yourself looking at a dark cloudy sky, but then you yourself are in space and you imagine clouds that you cannot see. As Weininger pointed out, Kant's space is absolute, like Newton's space, and not just a system of relations. But I don't see how one can imagine an absolutely empty space.

The third metaphysical argument says: “Space is not a discursive, or, as they say, general, concept of the relations of things in general, but a purely visual representation. Indeed, one can imagine only one single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, then they mean only parts of one and the same single space, moreover, these parts cannot precede the single all-encompassing space as its constituent elements (of which its addition would be possible), but can only be conceived as being in it. ; the manifold in it, and therefore also the general concept of spaces in general, is based solely on limitations. From this Kant concludes that space is an a priori intuition.

The essence of this argument is the denial of multiplicity in space itself. What we call "spaces" are neither examples of the general concept of "space" nor parts of a whole. I do not know exactly what, according to Kant, their logical status is, but, in any case, they logically follow space. For those who accept, as practically everyone does nowadays, a relativistic view of space, this argument falls away, since neither "space" nor "spaces" can be considered as substances.

The fourth metaphysical argument concerns mainly the proof that space is an intuition and not a concept. His premise is "space is imagined (or represented -- vorgestellt) as an infinitely given quantity." This is the view of a person living in a flat area, like the area where Koenigsberg is located. I do not see how an inhabitant of the Alpine valleys could accept it. It is difficult to understand how something infinite can be "given". I must take it for granted that the part of space that is given is that which is filled with objects of perception, and that for other parts we have only a sense of the possibility of movement. And if it is permissible to apply such a vulgar argument, then modern astronomers maintain that space is not really infinite, but is rounded, like the surface of a ball.

The transcendental (or epistemological) argument, which is best established in the Prolegomena, is clearer than the metaphysical arguments and is also more clear to be refuted. "Geometry", as we now know, is a name that combines two different scientific disciplines. On the one hand, there is pure geometry, which deduces consequences from axioms without questioning whether these axioms are true. It does not contain anything that does not follow from logic and is not "synthetic", and does not need figures, such as those used in geometry textbooks. On the other hand, there is geometry as a branch of physics, as it, for example, appears in the general theory of relativity - it is an empirical science in which axioms are derived from measurements and differ from the axioms of Euclidean geometry. Thus there are two types of geometry: one a priori but not synthetic, the other synthetic but not a priori. This gets rid of the transcendental argument.

Let us now try to consider the questions that Kant raises when he considers space in a more general way. If we proceed from the view, which is accepted in physics as self-evident, that our perceptions have external causes which are (in a certain sense) material, then we come to the conclusion that all real qualities in perceptions differ from qualities in their unperceived causes, but that there is a certain structural similarity between the system of perceptions and the system of their causes. There is, for example, a correspondence between colors (as perceived) and waves of a certain length (as inferred by physicists). Likewise, there must be a correspondence between space as an ingredient of perceptions and space as an ingredient in the system of unperceived causes of perceptions. All this is based on the principle "same cause, same effect", with the opposite principle: "different effects, different causes". Thus, for example, when visual representation A appears to the left of visual representation B, we will assume that there is some corresponding relation between cause A and cause B.

We have, according to this view, two spaces, one subjective and the other objective, one known in experience and the other only deduced. But there is no difference in this respect between space and other aspects of perception, such as colors and sounds. All of them in their subjective forms are known empirically. All of them, in their objective forms, are derived by means of the principle of causality. There is no reason to consider our knowledge of space in any way different from our knowledge of color and sound and smell.

As regards time, the situation is different, for if we keep faith in the imperceptible causes of perceptions, objective time must be identical with subjective time. If not, we run into the difficulties already considered in connection with lightning and thunder. Or take this case: you hear a person speaking, you answer him, and he hears you. His speech and his perceptions of your answer, both insofar as you touch them, are in an unperceivable world. And in this world, the first precedes the last. In addition, his speech precedes your perception of sound in the objective world of physics. Your perception of sound precedes your response in the subjective world of perception. And your answer precedes his perception of sound in the objective world of physics. It is clear that the relation "precedes" must be the same in all these statements. While there is therefore an important sense in which perceptual space is subjective, there is no sense in which perceptual time is subjective.

The above arguments presuppose, as Kant thought, that perceptions are caused by things in themselves, or, as we should say, by events in the world of physics. This assumption, however, is by no means logically necessary. If it is rejected, perceptions cease to be in any essential sense 'subjective', since there is nothing that can be opposed to them.

The "thing-in-itself" was a very uncomfortable element in Kant's philosophy, and it was rejected by his immediate successors, who accordingly fell into something very reminiscent of solipsism. The contradictions in Kant's philosophy inevitably led to the fact that the philosophers who were under his influence had to develop rapidly either in an empiricist or in an absolutist direction. In fact, German philosophy developed in the latter direction right up to the period after the death of Hegel.

Kant's immediate successor, Fichte (1762-1814), rejected "things in themselves" and carried subjectivism to a degree that apparently bordered on madness. He believed that the Self is the only finite reality and that it exists because it asserts itself. But the Self, which has a subordinate reality, also exists only because the Self accepts it. Fichte is important not as a pure philosopher, but as the theoretical founder of German nationalism in his "Speech to the German Nation" (1807-1808), in which he sought to inspire the Germans to resist Napoleon after the battle of Jena. The ego, as a metaphysical concept, was easily confused with Fichte's empirical; since I was a German, it followed that the Germans were superior to all other nations. "To have character and to be a German," says Fichte, "undoubtedly mean the same thing." On this basis, he developed a whole philosophy of nationalist totalitarianism, which had a very great influence in Germany.

His immediate successor Schelling (1775-1854) was more attractive but no less subjectivist. He was closely associated with German romance. Philosophically, he is insignificant, although he was famous in his time. An important result of the development of Kant's philosophy was the philosophy of Hegel.

Biography of Isaac Newton

Newton Isaac (1643-1727), English mathematician, mechanic and physicist, astronomer and astrologer, creator of classical mechanics, member (1672) and president (since 1703) of the Royal Society of London. One of the founders of modern physics, formulated the basic laws of mechanics and was the actual creator of a unified physical program for describing all physical phenomena based on mechanics; discovered the law of universal gravitation, explained the motion of the planets around the Sun and the Moon around the Earth, as well as the tides in the oceans, laid the foundations of continuum mechanics, acoustics and physical optics. Fundamental works "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy" (1687) and "Optics" (1704).

Developed (independently of G. Leibniz) differential and integral calculus. He discovered the dispersion of light, chromatic aberration, studied interference and diffraction, developed the corpuscular theory of light, and expressed a hypothesis that combined corpuscular and wave representations. Built a mirror telescope. Formulated the basic laws of classical mechanics. He discovered the law of universal gravitation, gave a theory of the motion of celestial bodies, creating the foundations of celestial mechanics. Space and time were considered absolute. Newton's work was far ahead of the general scientific level of his time were obscure to contemporaries. He was the director of the Mint, established the monetary business in England. A famous alchemist, Newton dealt with the chronology of the ancient kingdoms. He devoted theological works to the interpretation of biblical prophecy (mostly unpublished).

Newton was born on January 4, 1643 in the village of Woolsthorpe, (Lincolnshire, England) in the family of a small farmer who died three months before the birth of his son. The baby was premature; there is a legend that he was so small that he was placed in a sheepskin mitten lying on a bench, from which he once fell out and hit his head hard on the floor. When the child was three years old, his mother remarried and left, leaving him in the care of his grandmother. Newton grew up sickly and unsociable, prone to daydreaming. He was attracted by poetry and painting, he, far from his peers, made kites, invented a windmill, a water clock, a pedal cart.

The beginning of school life was difficult for Newton. He studied poorly, was a weak boy, and once classmates beat him until he lost consciousness. It was unbearable for the proud Newton to endure, and there was only one thing left: to stand out with academic success. By hard work, he achieved the fact that he took first place in the class.

Interest in technology made Newton think about the phenomena of nature; he was also deeply involved in mathematics. Jean Baptiste Bie later wrote about this: “One of his uncles, finding him one day under a hedge with a book in his hands, immersed in deep reflection, took the book from him and found that he was busy solving a mathematical problem. Struck by such a serious and active direction so young a man, he persuaded his mother not to resist further the desire of her son and send him to continue his studies.

After serious training, Newton entered Cambridge in 1660 as a Subsizzfra (the so-called poor students who were obliged to serve the members of the college, which could not but burden Newton). Started studying astrology Last year college education.

Newton took astrology seriously and defended it zealously against attacks from his colleagues. Studies in astrology and the desire to prove its significance prompted him to research in the field of the movement of celestial bodies and their influence on our planet.

In six years, Newton completed all the degrees of the college and prepared all his further great discoveries. In 1665 Newton became a master of arts. In the same year, when the plague was raging in England, he decided to temporarily settle in Woolsthorpe. It was there that he began to actively engage in optics. The leitmotif of all research was the desire to understand the physical nature of light. Newton believed that light is a stream of special particles (corpuscles) emitted from a source and moving in a straight line until they encounter obstacles. The corpuscular model explained not only the straightness of light propagation, but also the law of reflection (elastic reflection) and the law of refraction.

At this time, the work, which was destined to become the main great result of Newton's works, was already completed, in the main - the creation of a single, based on the laws of mechanics of the physical picture of the World formulated by him.

Having set the task of studying various forces, Newton himself gave the first brilliant example of its solution by formulating the law of universal gravitation. The law of universal gravitation allowed Newton to give a quantitative explanation of the motion of the planets around the Sun, the nature of sea tides. This could not but make a huge impression on the minds of researchers. The program of a unified mechanical description of all natural phenomena - both "terrestrial" and "celestial" for many years was established in physics. space time kant newton

In 1668 Newton returned to Cambridge and he soon received the Lucas Chair in Mathematics. Before him, this department was occupied by his teacher I. Barrow, who ceded the department to his beloved student in order to financially provide for him. By that time, Newton was already the author of the binomial and the creator (simultaneously with Leibniz, but independently of him) of the method of differential and integral calculus.

Not limited to theoretical studies alone, in the same years he designed a reflecting telescope (reflective). The second of the manufactured telescopes (improved) was the reason for the presentation of Newton as a member of the Royal Society of London. When Newton resigned his membership due to the impossibility of paying membership dues, it was considered possible, in view of his scientific merits, to make an exception for him, exempting him from paying them.

His theory of light and colors, outlined in 1675, provoked such attacks that Newton decided not to publish anything on optics while Hooke, his most bitter opponent, lived. From 1688 to 1694 Newton was a Member of Parliament.

By that time, in 1687, the "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy" came out - the basis of the mechanics of all physical phenomena, from the movement of celestial bodies to the propagation of sound. Several centuries later, this program determined the development of physics, and its significance has not been exhausted to this day.

The constant oppressive feeling of material insecurity, enormous nervous and mental stress was undoubtedly one of the causes of Newton's illness. The immediate impetus for the disease was a fire, in which all the manuscripts prepared by him perished. Therefore, for him great importance post of Warden of the Mint with the retention of a professorship at Cambridge. Zealously setting to work and quickly achieving notable success, Newton was appointed director in 1699. It was impossible to combine this with teaching, and Newton moved to London.

At the end of 1703 he was elected president of the Royal Society. By that time, Newton had reached the pinnacle of fame. In 1705, he was elevated to the dignity of knighthood, but, having a large apartment, six servants and a rich departure, he remains still alone.

The time for active creativity is over, and Newton is limited to preparing the publication of "Optics", reprinting the work "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy" and interpreting Holy Scripture(he owns the interpretation of the Apocalypse, an essay on the prophet Daniel).

Newton died on March 31, 1727 in London and is buried in Westminster Abbey. The inscription on his grave ends with the words: "Let mortals rejoice that such an adornment of the human race lived in their midst."

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Basic Attributes of Being

AT natural sciences although spatio-temporal representations are also based on a physical representation, they nevertheless differ significantly depending on the material levels of the existence of being. So...

In the Middle Ages, ideas about space were subject to eschatological criteria. The space was described, first of all, by religious and moral characteristics: the bottom is hell, the top is the abode of God, the east is paradise...

The concept of time in classical thermodynamics

The most complete and consistent attempt to separate time from matter was made by Newton. He called it absolute, true, mathematical time, which "... by its very essence, without any relation to anything external ...

Spatio-temporal structure of the world

Any movement presupposes, in one way or another, a change in position in space, which is carried out in one way or another, in time. Despite the apparent obviousness of the concepts of space and time ...

space time being philosophical From the standpoint of dialectical materialistic philosophy, movement is not the only form of existence of matter...

Space and time - forms of being

What are the basic properties of space and time can we indicate? First of all, space and time; objective and real, i.e. exist independently of the consciousness of people and their knowledge of this objective reality...

Space and time in the theories of Kant and Newton

Modern physics has abandoned the concept of absolute space and time of Newton's classical physics. Relativistic theory has demonstrated that space and time are relative. Apparently no phrases...

The modern understanding of space and time has developed as a result of a long historical process knowledge, the content of which, in particular, was the struggle between substantive1 and relational2 approaches to understanding their essence...

Space and time as a form of existence of matter

When analyzing these issues, it is necessary to take into account not only the fact that space and time are inextricably linked with the movement of matter, but also the existence of subordination between them: “Motion is the essence of time and space”...

In the history of philosophy and science, two main concepts of space and time have developed: 1. The substantial concept considers space and time as special independent entities that, along with and independently of material objects ...

Space and time: origins and content of concepts

Space and time as forms of the existence of matter have both properties common to them and characteristic of each of these forms. Their universal properties include: objectivity and independence from human consciousness...

Modern problems of the history and philosophy of science

Meshkova I.N. In classical scientific thinking, it was traditional to define space and time as an object of natural science and speculative-philosophical constructions...

The formation of the concepts of space and time in philosophical science

The most important philosophical problems concerning space and time are the question of the essence of space and time, the relationship of these forms of being with matter, the objectivity of space-time relationships and patterns...